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BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a jury verdict of guilty in a
criminal action against appellant

Joseph B. Mora, for aggravated

assault.
! DISPOSITION OF THE LOWER COURT
The matter was tried before the Honorable Judge
Bryant H. Croft, sitting with a jury.

The jury returned

a verdict finding the defendant guilty of aggravated assault
and a judgment, sentence and commitment was entered.
the action of the trial court the appellant appeals.

From

RELIEF SOUGHT ON^APPEAL
Respondent seeks affirmation of the verdict and
judgment of the lower court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The State's first witness, Leslie Appling testified
that she knew appellant (T.86), that she saw him on
November 16, 1974, at approximately 6:30 p.m. in Emigration
Canyon (T.86), and that she told him that his girlfriend,
Cindy Proctor, was at Jim Ingle's house (T.87).
The State's chief witness, James Ingle testified
that he went to answer a knock at his door about 7:15 p.m.
and found appellant on the stairs leading to the second
floor of his house (T.101).

He further testified that

appellant asked questions about the whereabouts of Ms.
Proctor and when Mr. Ingle refused to answer the questions
and told appellant to leave, appellant pulled a revolver
from his coat (T.103), hit Mr* Ingle in the head with
his hand, put the cocked gun to Mr. Ingle's forehead and
asked further questions about Ms. Proctor.

Mr. Ingle

stated that after he had answered the questions and wrote
down some information, appellant put the cocked gun in
Mi:. Ingle's mouth, told him not to call the police and
left (T.109).
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The appellant testified that when he went into
the house Mr. Ingle pointed a rifle at him (T.163,164)
and that he knocked the rifle aside (T.165) and pointed
his gun at Mr. Ingle (T.165).

The appellant testified

that he made Mr. Ingle give him some requested information
concerning the whereabouts of his girlfriend (T.167)
and left (T.168).
On the second day of trial, appellant's counsel
made a motion to suppress testimony regarding guilty
pleas appellant had entered on two previous felony charges
(T.190-193).

The court denied the motion, concluding that

the convictions were valid and admissable (T.199).

Appellant's

counsel asked the court's permission to advise his client
to refuse to answer further questions of the prosecutor
(T?199).

The court denied this request (T.199).

The court

then asked if appellant's counsel had a motion to make
regarding lesser included offenses (T.200).

Appellantfs

counsel said Mr. Mora had declined his recommendation to
have such an instruction given (T.200).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ALLOWING THE
PROSECUTOR TO QUESTION APPELLANT ABOUT
ACTS.

HIS PRIOR CRIMINAL

During redirect examination the defense attorney
asked appellant if a weapon had been used in the two
prior felonies for which he had been convicted and he
replied no (T.202).

Prior to this, appellant had inferred

that he had brought the gun to Mr. Ingle's house only
for self-protection (T.170).

Upon cross-examination, the

prosecutor proceeded to ask about the gun used in the
incident for which the appellant was then being tried.
Then the prosecutor asked five questions as to whether
or not appellant had offered to or threatened to do
violence to other people, specifically one Rick Hausgo,
prior to the alleged aggravated assault in question.
A sixth question was asked in regards to violence appellant
committed against Leslie Appling after the assault
incident (T.204,205).

Appellant denied having offered

or;threatened violence to others but admitted violence
to Leslie Appling in reply to the sixth question.
It is generally true that in a criminal prosecution
evidence of other crimes or offenses which tend to
pjrove a character trait of the accused will be excluded.
However, there are several well-recognized exceptions
and limitations to this general rule.

One important

exception is when one is attacking the credibility of the
accused's testimony.

State v, Adams, 26 Utah 2d 377,
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489 P.2d 1191 (1971), involved a defendant charged with
assault with a deadly weapon.

Through questioning by his

own counsel Adams testified that he had been accused of
prior criminal conduct.

Such testimony was an attempt

to show that defendant had been previously harrassed by
police authorities.

The prosecutor delved further into

these unrelated fights and instances of violence in order
to impeach defendant's previous testimony.

The court

first recognized the previously stated general rule by
stating:
"There is no doubt that defendant
j was questioned about some matters
I pertaining to his misconduct about
which he ordinarily should not be
subjected to inquiry."
But the court then established a rationale for the
aforementioned exception:
"In [cross-examination defendant's]
own counsel sought to show that
defendant was a man of good nature and
good character. . . The defendant
himself having thus opened up the subject, it is quite proper for the State
to question him on matters which might
tend to challenge, contradict or
explain his assertion."
Id. at 1194.
In accord Weber Basin Water Conservancy District v. Ward,
10 Utah 2d 29, 347 P.2d 862 (1959).
The analogy to the present case is easily apparent.
Through defendant's testimony that he had not used a
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gun during his prior felonies and that he had brought
the gun to Mr. Ingle's house only for self-protection
he tried to assert the inference that he was not inclined to utilize a weapon, even in circumstances where
it would be most expected.

After the appellant had

opened the door on this character trait the prosecution
was correct in asking appellant about previous times
that he allegedly professed a desire and willingness
to do violence to or even kill others.
Contrary to the charges in appellant's brief,
this line of questioning by the prosecutor did have
probative value and was not invoked for the sole purpose of disgracing the defendant as a person of evil
character.
j

; ,

In fact, this evidence conforms to the standard

set out in State v« Johnson, 25 Utah 2d 160, 478
P.2d 491 (1970), a case on which appellant relies.
There the court ruled that evidence would be admissible
when the:^

.;,
"evidence concerning other crimes
comes in as an intregal part of
evidence which is competent and
relevant to the charge upon which
he is being tried. . . n Id at 492.

The only contested issue of fact in this case was
whether the appellant had used the gun in self-defense
or for the purpose of threatening Mr. Ingle.

By showing

that Mr. Mora possessed a trait for violence, as
evidenced by the instances brought out in cross-examination/ the prosecution correctly attempted to contradict
or modify appellant's assertion of a non-violent character.
The Supreme Court of Washington concurred with
this type of cross-examination in State v.
468 P.2d 684 (1970).

Washington,

The court affirmed a preliminary

ruling by the trial court which acknowledged that if
the defendant took the stand and testified as to his
good conduct, the prosecutor would be permitted to
question him on cross-examination on a specific act of
bad conduct.

The court said:

"He [defendant] could have testified
about events of the night of the crime
and those leading up to it, without
any fear of having his prior act of
violence brought out on cross-examination. Only if he chose to assert that
he was a non-violent person would the
subject be opened up." :id. at 685.
Furthermore, in light of the abundance of other
evidence which supported a conviction of aggravated
assault, it cannot be said that defendant suffered undue
prejudice by the reception of this questioning.

Even

if such questioning was out of place, appellantfs
denial of previous misconduct should adequately refute any
inferences made by such questioning.

Any error committed

in this matter must be deemed harmless error since it did
not have ". . . a substantial influence in bringing about

the verdict cr finding" and this is required if a verdict
is to be set aside for reason of erroneous admission of
evidence.

Rule 4, Utah Rules of Evidence, p. 3.
POINT II

THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING APPELLANT'S
MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE OF HIS PRIOR GUILTY PLEAS
TO FELONY CHARGES.

'

Appellant's counsel made a motion to suppress
evidence of prior convictions alleging that the guilty
pleas that his client had entered in 1959 and 1963 must
be deemed void and testimony concerning these convictions
i

should be disallowed because the record did not reflect
the fact that Mora had voluntarily and knowingly waived
his right of trial by jury, his right to confront
accusers and his right against self incrimination
(T. 190,193)*

After the trial judge listened to appellant's

testimony concerning these prior convictions and heard
arguments by both counsel he determined that the convictions were valid and testimony of such was admissible
for impeachment purposes (T.198,199).
The well established rule that once a defendant
has taken a witness stand he may be questioned about
whether or not he has been convicted of any prior felonies
has been incorporated in our statutes.
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, states that:

Title 77-44-5,

"if a defendant offers himself as
a witness, he may be cross-examined
by the counsel for the state the
same as any other witness."
and section 78-24-9, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, requires
that:
" . . . a witness must answer as to
the fact of his previous conviction
of a felony."
See State v. Harless, 23 Utah 2d 128, 459, P.2d 210
(1969) .
Appellant does not question the fact that a
defendant can be cross-examined about prior felony
convictions for impeachment purposes.

However, he does

argue that a guilty plea is knowingly entered only when
the three aforementioned constitutional guarantees are
specifically waived.

He bases this assertion on his

narrow reading of certain dictum found in the case of
Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23
L.Ed.2d 74 (1969).

The holding of the court in the case

was that the trial record must reflect that the accused
voluntarily and intelligently entered a plea of guilty.
He further contends that since the records of his
guilty pleas do not reflect such waivers, those convictions
are constitutionally void and therefore cannot be used
for impeachment purposes.
In Utah, there is a presumption that a plea of
guilty is knowingly and intelligently made, and a

defendant who attacks this presumption must overcome
it by showing clearly that he was prejudiced by a
denial of his constitutional rights.

Mayne v. Turner,

24 Utah 2d 195, 198, 468 P.2d 369, 371 (1970).

For

the following reasons, respondent submits that appellant
has not overcome this presumption.
The only evidence that appellant presented
in support of his argument that these convictions were
void was his own self-serving, unsupported testimony.
He offered no record or transcripts of the prior proceedings.

Such uncorroborated evidence clearly does

not suffice to meet the hearing burden of overcoming
the presumption of validity of the guilty pleas.
In any event, the testimony given by appellant
does not support his contention of invalid pleas.
Appellant admitted at trial that he was properly represented by counsel in both of the cases in question
in which he plead guilty (T.183,184).

This fact alone

presents a presumption that he has been fully advised
concerning his rights.

Johnson v. Turner, 24 Utah

2d 439, 442, 473, P.2d 901, 904 (1971), Arbuckle v. Turner,
306 F.Supp. 825 (Utah 1969).

Appellant further admitted

at trial that at least in the first instance he was
warned that he was waiving certain constitutional rights
(T.183).

Further, no evidence was produced to show that

appellant was incompetant or not in control of his mental

faculties when the pleas were made.

Such testimony

reaffirms the presumption that appellant did make
counseled, knowing and voluntary decisions when he
plead guilty.
Furthermore, none of the United States Supreme
Court cases after Boykin have required a judge to get
a specific waiver of the rights suggested by appellant.
See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742. 90 S.Ct.
1463, 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970), McMann v. Richardson, 397
U.S. 759, (1970), Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S.
790 (1970), and North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25
(1970).

'
The United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit,

held in United States v. Webb, 433 F.2d 400 (1st Cir.
1970), that the specific waiver of certain constitutional
rights was an unnecessary element of a valid guilty plea.
In that case, after discussion with counsel/ the defendant
pled guilty to violating the Dyer Act.

He later contended

that the court failed to inform him that by pleading
guilty, he was waiving certain constitutional rights.
The court reasoned that it was self-evident that these
rights were being waived, and that it would not add to
defendant's understanding to "require the court to recite
a ritualistic list of constitutional rights that are obviously
being waived."

Id at 403.
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A final point should be noted in regards to
Boykin,

Careful reading of the cases defining the limits

of Boykin shows that this 1969 case is clearly not
retroactive and therefore is inapplicable to the earlier
guilty pleas in question.

Although the United States

Supreme Court has not ruled specifically on the retroactive application of the Boykin rule, Brady v. United
States, supra, at 747 footnote number 4, the issue has
been raised in several circuit courts and it has always
been held to be prospective only.
portance is the Tenth Circuit

Of particular im-

decision in Perry v.

i

Crouse, 42^ F.2d 1083 (10th Cir. 1970), wherein the
court stated:
"Considering the reasoning and the
governing criteria on retroactivity,
we conclude that Boykin v. Alabama
should not be applied retroactively
and agree with numerous cogent
opinions to this effect." Id at
1085. In accord Arbuckle v. Turner,
440 F.2d 586 (10th Cir. 1971).
Thus, appellant has failed to show that the
guilty pleas were invalid under Boykin, and, a fortiori,
has not met his burden of proving that the pleas were
not knowingly and voluntarily made under the standards
in effect at the time they were entered.
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Appellant relies heavily on Loper v. Beto, 405
U. S. 443, 30 L.Ed.2d 592, 92 S.Ct. 589 (1971), to
emphasize the idea that admission of void convictions
into evidence constitutes denial of due process.

Loper

involved a guilty plea that was given in violation of the
accused's right to counsel at trial. As previously noted,
appellant testified he was represented by counsel in
both instances so Loper can be easily distinguished.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN NOT INCLUDING
AN INSTRUCTION ON THE LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE OF SIMPLE
ASSAULT.
The court specifically asked appellant's counsel
if he wanted to make a motion regarding lesser included
offense (T.200).

Mr. Kunkler replied "Your Honor, it has

been my advice to my client to move the Court to put in
an instruction concerning the lesser included offense of
simple assault, and my client does not wish to do that.
It would be my recommendation to put one in, but he does
not want to." (T.200).

Despite this statement the court

considered the issue and concluded that the instruction
of simple assault could not reasonably be supported by
the evidence.

He said he would not submit it to the jury

even if Mora wasn't opposed to it (T.211,201).

And later,

after the instruction to the jury had been given the court

asked if there were any exceptions (T.223).

Appellant

raised no exception to the fact that an instruction on
the lesser included offense was not given (T.223,223).
It has been consistently held by this court
that a defendant should clearly indicate his desire
to have a jury instruction given regarding a lesser
included offense.

See State v. Valdezf 19 Utah 2d

426, 432 P.2d 53 (1967).

As this court stated in

State v. Standrod, 547 P.2d 215 (1976):

i

"Ordinarily a litigant cannot
claim error on an appeal for the failure
of the trial court to give an instruction which was not requested
and no exception taken to a failure
to give it." Id. at 218.
In the instant case, the appellant did not

request such instruction and specifically declined
a recommendation by his attorney to do so.

Additionally,

appellant did not raise any exceptions to the absence of
such an instruction.

Such inaction can be seen as

a calculated decision on the part of appellant to allow
the jury only two verdict options; either guilty or
not guilty of aggravated assault.

In this respect

the instant case is clearly distinguishable from the
case relied on by appellant, State v. Close, 28 Utah
144, 499 P.2d 287 (1972).

In Close the court found

it important that it was not a case "where it should be
deemed that defendant made a deliberate choice of
risking all or nothing by electing to go to the

jury only on the major offense."

I<3. at 288.

Once a

defendant has taken this risk and lost because the
evidence supports his conviction, he should not be
allowed to appeal simply because he calculated incorrectly.
Another general rule followed in this state is
that a trial court need not instruct on lesser included
crimes in every case; it must do so only where there
is some reasonable basis in the evidence to justify
the giving of such instructions.

See State v. McCarthy,

25 Utah 2d 425, 483 P.2d 890 (1971).
In State v. Dougherty, 550 P.2d 175 (1976),
this Court recently dealt with this issue.

One of the

three situations in which it said the problem of lesser
included offenses would frequently arise is when, as
in the present case;
"Elements of the greater offense
include all the elements of the
lesser offense."
The court concluded that in:
". . . such a situation instructions
on the lesser included offense may
be given, because all elements of
the lesser offense have been proved.
However, such an instruction may
properly be refused if the prosecution has met its burden of proof
on the greater offense, and there
is no evidence tending to reduce
the greater offense."
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A quick review of the evidence demonstrates
the instruction was properly refused by the trial
judge.

According to appellant's own testimony he

entered Mr. Ingle's home, uninvited, and while there
pointed a cocked gun at Mr. Ingle's head at least
twice (T.171,177).

There is no factual question

as to Mr. Mora's presence or his use of a deadly
weapon.

The only factual question before the jury

was whether or not he brandished his weapon in selfdefense or for the purpose of threatening Mr. Ingle.
The evidence in this case supports the instruction
on aggravated assault.

No instruction was needed

on lesser offense of simple assault because the
evidence clearly showed, and appellant admitted that
a gun (deadly weapon) was involved.

The jury could

not have found defendant guilty of simple assault
under these facts.
The discretional refusal on the part of the
trial judge to submit such an instruction should
be upheld.

The authority of the court to use its

discretion in instructing on lesser offenses has been
upheld numerous times.

State v. Mitchell, 3 Utah 2d

70, 278 P.2d 618 (1955), United States v. Enos, 453,
F.2d 342 (9th Cir. 1972).
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State v, Valdez, supra, a case of assault with
a deadly weapon, also involved a defendant who was
complaining on appeal that an instruction of simple
assault should have been given even though he had
not previously requested it.

In affirming defendant's

conviction the court stated:

I
•'"I."

I

"We are firmly committed to the
proposition that the rules of law
and procedure must be adhered to,
particularly in a criminal case.
But once a fair trial has been
afforded the defendant and a verdict which is supported by the
evidence rendered, the proceedings
are presumed to be valid; and we
are not disposed to reverse for mere
technicalities or irregularities
unless they put the defendant at
some substantial disadvantage or
had some material bearing on the
fairness of the proceedings or its
outcome." Id., at 55.

Certainly the supported verdict rendered in

this case should not be reversed because an unsupported,
unrequested instruction was not put before the jury.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, respondent contends
1) that cross-examination on defendants past criminal
conduct and prior felony convictions was not prejudicial error and 2) that instruction of simple assault
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was properly not submitted to the jury.

Therefore,

respondent respectfully submits that appellant's
request for reversal or a new trial be denied and that
the verdict and judgment of the jury at trial be
affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
EARL F. DORIUS
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent

